

26 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training


SUBJECT: Recommendations Concerning a Seminar for Senior Officers

1. The OTR ad hoc committee -- set up and directed by you to consider the desirability of establishing a training program for senior officers (GS-15/16) -- recommends that priority consideration be given now to its development. There appear to be some compelling reasons at this time why such a step should be taken. Much emphasis has been given to improving and broadening Agency training for junior and mid-career officers -- with the general objective of deepening their understanding of the intelligence profession as it operates in a world of growing complexity. This objective is deserving of at least equal emphasis at the senior officer level. The needs of their own personal development combined with the urgency of maintaining Agency professionalism suggest the existence of a major requirement for such a program. The objectives would be to provide these officers with the opportunity and resources to review the status of the intelligence profession, to comprehend developing trends in the profession about which they may be only dimly aware, and to re-evaluate and sharpen their own skills. An additional objective would be to provide these officers with the most profound judgments available concerning domestic and foreign affairs, the relationships between them, and the potential impact of these events upon intelligence as a major function of government. A complementary objective would be the ultimate establishment of a national intelligence seminar at this senior level -- open to State and DOD -- which would represent an additional means through which CIA could exercise leadership and exert influence in the intelligence community.

2. The following additional considerations underlie our recommendation:

a. There is no appropriate program currently existing which provides senior intelligence officers with an opportunity to review their own profession and to re-evaluate or hone their own professional skills. Many other agencies concerned with National Security affairs have such programs and the Civil Service Commission recently established the Federal Executive Institute to fill this need on behalf of old-line domestic agencies. In CIA the Advanced Intelligence Seminar (average grade about 14) and the COS Seminar represent the nearest approximation to a "senior" course. The COS Seminar is, of

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course, visualized for the CS, and the while processing- study visualized for a truly "senior" program (it is particularly limited by the two-week time factor).

b. The non-Agency senior courses to which Agency officers are posted (war colleges, State Senior Seminar, FEI, management programs) do not consider the intelligence profession. (I have attended both NWC and FEI and, therefore, speak from personal experience). They are important as representational assignments, and there is much substance to be gained. But, the war colleges deal with subjects which are essentially familiar to a senior intelligence officer (however new they might be to a pilot or a destroyer captain), and the FEI (a valuable experience) is aimed primarily at personal growth and renewal -- the achievement of managerial balance and health. This is dictated by the enormous variety of agencies represented in a class. FEI simply could not concentrate on the problems of a particular activity within government.

Beyond this, the number of available spaces for CIA officers in the senior schools is not sufficient to provide training for all of those deserving this kind of opportunity. This suggests the existence of a serious long-term gap -- or void -- in the professional development of many of our most promising officers. Many will have had only an orientation program (some have not had that much) and perhaps a special course or two (Grid or Management). This suggests the need for a senior program -- not to replace the others, but rather to provide opportunity for an additional number of officers (50 a year would more than double our current opportunity level).

c. The DIS National Senior Intelligence Course is, in fact, neither national nor senior. CIA has not found it particularly stimulating -- although it does provide our officers who attend with an appreciation of the vastness and complexity of the DOD intelligence effort. It would not represent what one would have in mind for a truly senior course.

d. There continues to be a judgement on the part of some top officials in CIA that parochialism inhibits our activities -- particularly among senior officers. While not a cure-all, a carefully tailored senior program might well contribute to a diminution of this problem.

e. The world -- domestic and foreign -- continues to grow in complexity. The relation between domestic and foreign affairs is inevitably moving closer. [REDACTED] sums up the situation in his Studies in Intelligence (Spring, 70) article entitled "The Agency and the Future." He states that, "more

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discuss more thought, more analysis, and attention to the problem of understanding the processes of change and their implications for intelligence cannot but be desirable for an Agency whose purpose in being is to tell the US Government not just what has happened and is happening, but what is likely to happen." [REDACTED] suggests an OIR seminar on the future. The future -- and the art of futurology -- would obviously be a vital part of the proposed program.

3. Virtually every discussion of this proposal surfaced vigorous opposition -- or presumed opposition. The major factors appear to be the following:

- a. It will be expensive in a time of shrinking budgets -- real estate (1000 M. Glebe Rd. not accepted as "first class") additional personnel, travel money, money for high-class lectures -- are all significant considerations.
- b. It has been proposed before -- or tried before (CS Seminar) -- and has either been shot down or failed. The claim that "the time is now ripe" is old hat. The time is always ripe for whatever one wants to do. The OIR program call has been reflecting lack of requirement for such a program. How do we now rationalize this requirement?
- c. The CS will object, particularly if representatives from other agencies attend. The DDI will perhaps find it hard to accept the existence of such a requirement.
- d. The "work-load" syndrome will be re-stimulated. We have too many people in training now. How can we spare more -- particularly at the level suggested.
- e. This will not fly unless it is a joint program involving the directorates from its very inception. Endorsement by the DCI would be "nice to have," but not necessarily significant in really getting such a program off the ground.

4. For the reasons cited in paragraphs 1 and 2, and in spite of the objections in paragraph 3, we recommend that a target date of fall, 1971, be set for the establishment of a senior seminar on intelligence -- to be of approximately three months duration (this time frame represents a shortening of your initial proposal -- as a compromise with many suggestions we unearthed which suggested a 4-6 week program) -- to be conducted twice yearly -- and to include twenty-five officers per seminar. We also recommend the planning of alternative programs which would allow for the following possibilities: an all-CIA seminar; a seminar including CIA, State, and DOD officers for the entire three-month period; a seminar including CIA, State, and DOD for the first two months, but limited to CIA for the final month.

5. We need that generally the fall of the house of cards has not been discussed in detail):

a. The US Domestic Scene

In many respects more important for this level officer than for the juniors. Would be aimed not merely at the "concerned citizen," but at the intelligence professional who must now be more attuned to the relation between domestic and "national security" affairs, and sensitive to the points at which they coincide. This section should include not only an analysis of the disruptions and cleavages in US society, but how these factors relate to developments in US foreign policy and to evaluations of the US by other nations. Should include congressional views of foreign policy and impact thereupon, plus views of influential newspapermen and academicians (in addition, how do these people see CIA fitting into US society of the 70s). On the other hand -- a critique of Congress, the fourth estate, and the role of academics would be useful. We might even go so far as to discuss the state of literary and performing arts in the US. (2 weeks)

b. The US and the World

This should include sophisticated discussions of the key geographic areas (with emphasis on varying or conflicting interpretations of developments in these areas) and US relations and problems therein. This would be standard. However, we should add studies of particular and grinding policy problems ("the loss of China" -- "US failures in Latin America" -- "the US as the world's gendarme," etc.) (2 weeks)

c. The National Security Machinery

Briefly -- what is it, but beyond that -- is it creaking? The NSC, the special committees, etc. Proposals for change. (1 week)

d. The Intelligence Community and Its Relation to National Security Machinery

It's hard to see new subjects here, but they would be dealt with, one would hope, in a highly sophisticated and frank atmosphere. USIB and its committees, IIR under Cline, intelligence and military planning, duplication and competition. (1 week)

e. CIA

Its relationship as an agency to White House, to Congress, in US society, and its internal developments, prospects, and

particular DCT? The question as to how far we go on this would be influenced by whether non-CIA officers will attend. (1 week)

6. Supplementing the blocs of instruction considered in paragraph 5 we would recommend addition of the following (time allotment undetermined):

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a. The Impact of Science and Technology

This could involve a broad consideration of the societal consequences of technological developments -- narrowing down to its profound consequences for intelligence. Perhaps a field trip patterned upon the DBS&T training program.

b. Strategic Military Equations

A view (or a series of views) by the "experts" on nuclear relationships and the role of war in modern society. Perhaps a field trip patterned upon Mid-Career course.

c. Management/Planning

We are told that there are numerous programs of high potential available. Problem is to supplement Grid or planning courses possibly already attended. Could use some of the personal approach of FEI. Might even consider some kind of sensitivity or T-group program. Possibility of a Brookings week similar to previous mid-career courses.

7. A few final thoughts emerge:

a. We might bring in senior officials of certain foreign services for seminars.

b. We should attempt to utilize the results of historical studies being produced within CIA -- wherever they are evaluative in nature. If not, perhaps the Senior Seminar could add an evaluative note to selected studies.

c. Inclusion of research papers should be considered -- although we are not recommending at this time.

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